Who is laurent kabila

Kabila himself received even less support when the question was: 'In the Presidential elections, which candidate would you vote for? Nonetheless, in what was to become something of a pattern, when respondents were asked 'what opinion do you have of Kabila as President of the Republic?

Given his policies, one could assume that Kabila was in a strong position but it was not the case. There could have been few successful revolutionary leaders who had as few tools with which to govern as did Kabila. None of the four parties making up the AFDL had any grass root structures or even a substantial membership. It was made up of essentially four elements:. The inherent weakness of the regime is related to the speed with which the old regime of Mobutu was finally destroyed - all of eight months.

This period was too short for those struggling to overthrow it to form a coherent united and tested force. Indeed, there were few Congolese who actually fought in this 'war of liberation'. This phenomenon of lightning speed change with the resulting lack of control, organisation and discipline is not new for Congo.

It occurred during the independence struggle and again during the uprisings between to Kabila responded to the dilemma of his initial weakness in three ways. First, he re-employed many members of Mobutu's security apparatus. There seems to have been little or no 're-education' for them. Second he co-opted individual leaders from virtually every significant political and ethnic group in Congo - as individuals but in no way as representatives of structured organisations.

Both they and the many returned exiles were, therefore, utterly dependent on Kabila's approbation since they had no independent or institutional base of power. Third, although hampered by his dependence on Rwanda and Uganda in the eyes of the Congolese, Kabila successfully presented himself as an avid nationalist, fending off the designs of imperial forces such as France, the UN, the US, etc.

The re-education seminars for ordinary citizens soon petered out, as it became apparent that the Congolese public had no taste for them. The 'new morality' was also largely abandoned with excption of truly popular themes such as serious attempts to limit corruption especially at the level where it touched poor, ordinary citizens. The Chembe Chembe - very much resented and even attacked in some instances - were also allowed to fade away.

In a further attempt to strengthen his personal hold on power, Kabila systematically reduced the power of the AFDL as a structure that was supposed to dominate the political and administrative scene.

This also marginalised the influence of his Alliance partners. As noted earlier, none of these parties had substantial structures or cadres; thus, when a leader was sidelined, there was little left of the party's influence. The first to go was of course Kisase Ngandu, who was assassinated long before Kinshasa was captured. While it appeared that Bugera and Masasu were both at the very top of the leadership hierarchy, first, Masasu was condemned by a military court and given twenty years in prison and then Bugera was removed as Secretary General of the AFDL and given a high cabinet post without function.

Although the AFDL was supposed to be second only to the President, in reality, it became a structure, which had served its purpose - for Kabila - and was month after month rendered increasingly impotent. Finally, Kabila made a virtue out of unpredictability. Some Mobutu era and current leaders were jailed, some were not. It was never clear what could land one in jail or what one had to do to stay out of jail. As a result politicians both in and out of the government were increasingly careful not to offend the President.

Although the Congolese public had high hopes for the change that the AFDL victory was supposed to bring, it was also a very realistic and pragmatic citizenry. If Kabila did not create the desired pluralism, in response to the question 'do you think it is necessary for Kabila to meet the leaders of the Congolese opposition ['opposition' was understood to mean the non-violent opposition to Mobutu]?

Kabila seems to have been aware and responsive to some of these desires. In fact it preferred the old opposition to the AFDL, but in the meantime if there were some fundamental improvements more than half the respondents gave Kabila their approval. The reason for this apparent inconsistency lay in the terrible social conditions, which faced ordinary Congolese at the end of the Mobutu regime and even more dramatically at the beginning of the Kabila period.

When asked which of the following events they had personally experienced in their families of among neighbours on the street or community they lived in, they responded as follows :. The second success of the regime, which was reported to have had a real impact on the lives of ordinary Congolese, was control over inflation. This was a significant achievement and especially important for the poor who still employed Congolese currency the more affluent almost exclusively employed US dollars.

This was accomplished with almost no foreign aid, which was delayed due to conflict between the Government and the international community over the thwarted UN investigation of massacres of Hutu and other human rights violations.

Kabila did not respond to the public will in many respects, particularly in the areas of civil rights and political pluralism. There were probably two reasons for this: first, his background does not suggest a commitment to democratic values, and, second, despite his victory over Mobutu, he was constantly overshadowed in popularity by Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of the UDPS. Moreover, all evidence suggests that the UDPS had a national structure at its disposal, which was superior to that of the more recently established AFDL.

The following chart illustrates the level of popularity of Kabila and Tshisekedi in Kinshasa as reflected in responses to the question, "whom would you vote for if there were presidential elections?

It was said earlier that Kabila received a remarkably short political honeymoon for a leader at the head of a 'revolutionary liberation army' who had defeated an unpopular dictator.

Harsh criticism of Kabila and his regime was particularly strong among the political and civil society elite who could articulate opinions and have them heard both in Congo and abroad. As a Congolese observer stated in March , "Kabila et ses 'commissaires' semblent faire abstraction des groupes et des personnes qui depuis , On 22 March , a few weeks before he took the control of Kinshasa, Kabila outlined some aspects of future policy:.

On one hand, political party leaders who did not join Kabila argued, perhaps unwisely, that the legitimacy emanating from the NSC was the only real expression of the will of the Congolese people and should therefore be followed. They were handicapped by several developments: first, that so many of them were willing to be co-opted by Kabila; second, that, in the view of some, there was a certain reasonableness in Mobutu's position that the country had to be put in order before party political competition could usefully begin; and third, the fact that they had very weak grass-roots structures - only the UDPS, somewhat crippled by the number of its leaders who joined Kabila- could claim to have a nation-wide structure.

On the other hand, Kabila's order forbidding free political party activity did not have the support of public opinion. In the end, despite numerous challenges, political party activity was overwhelmingly interrupted or ended. This resulted in repeated confrontations and imprisonment of leaders and followers. Some politicians went abroad to organise political parties opposed to Kabila.

This and similar formations were considered attempts by Mobutists to counter their loss, but until August , their impact was small indeed. Civil society, that is to say the leaders of NGOs and churches, presented a different type of challenge to the regime. In principle, their policy options were similar to the non-violent opposition parties. But there were critical differences between the NGOs and the political parties.

First, the NGOs even without counting the churches were numerous and had strong local affiliates. Second, they had taken over many social service functions; it would have been virtually impossible simply to ignore their existence. Third, they had strong allies abroad and received direct financial support from these allies.

At a grass-roots level, they were in a position to mobilise the population, to report on AFDL, army and administrative misdeeds - and they did so. In total, although not formally political, they were a more serious potential danger to governmental control of the population than were the opposition political parties.

If one adds the infrastructure of the churches, especially the Catholic Church, to the vast network of NGOs, one is left with an enormous though not centralised source of independent influence.

It was therefore inevitable that the Kabila regime and the civil society organisations should come into conflict. About delegates from a variety of NGOs attended and raised many issues, which can be viewed as political. For instance, while it saluted the AFDL's success in ending the Mobutu dictatorship, the conference declared its concern for the protection of fundamental liberties, the absence of political dialogue, indiscipline in the army, the absence of a clear-cut division between the state and the AFDL, and finally, over the absence of a constitutional framework.

Most of these decisions were implicitly critical of Kabila's policies. It should be noted that this conference occurred only a month after he had taken Kinshasa - the honeymoon was short indeed.

The regime's reaction to this challenge was expressed at the conference by the then Minister of Reconstruction, Etienne Mbaya, who 'reminded' participants that the actions of civil society had to be inscribed in the spirit and priorities established by the government. Mbaya made the distinction between the Mobutu era, during which civil society was obliged to intervene in certain vital sectors of the society such as hospitals, roads and schools, and the post-liberation era.

The new government would assume all its responsibilities, and its priorities were the rehabilitation of the state, changing people's 'mentalities' [i. Finally and most importantly, the minister announced that he would soon organise a meeting so that civil society leaders could absorb the different priorities of the government. The June Conference posed a serious problem for the regime. On the one hand it proved not only the strength and wide representation of NGOs and the support they were able to garner from abroad, but also their ability to co-ordinate their activities on a national scale.

Many of the discussions showed that participants were uninhibited about stating their views on matters, which were of broad national and specifically political interest.

Given the predilections of the regime to centralise and control, this amounted to a clear-cut challenge. But, having found little support and much opposition to its policy of forbidding political party activity, it would have been costly to forbid the activities of the hundreds of civil society associations, especially at such an early stage in the regime's existence Hence the attempt to set parameters for civil society their activities and plans must fit into the state's development plans and the announcement that the government would organise its own national development conference.

The advantage for the regime of this approach was clear: first, it would control the agenda, second, it could invite the participation not only of civil society representatives, but also of other institutions such as local governments, and it would be nearly impossible for them to refuse participation.

At the start, this approach appeared to work well. Preparatory conferences in both the provinces, and even abroad in Europe and North America met with considerable approbation, participation and enthusiasm.

But the success of the preparatory conferences undermined the value, which they were presumably to have for the regime. Neither the AFDL nor the provincial administrations had the power or the organisation to prevent the preparatory conferences from taking on a life of their own. For example, when the South Kivu preparatory conference met from 3 - 9 January , it focused on questions of Tutsi nationality, discussed incursion by the RPA the Rwandan Patriotic Army into the province, and even questioned the agreements made between Kabila and Kagame.

These were extremely sensitive political issues. At the preparatory conference in Kisangani, participants criticised the behaviour of certain AFDL cadres, expressed a preference for a federal form of government, liberalisation of the rules governing political parties, and the effective application of democratic principles. At the time that the preparatory conferences were taking place, the Kabila government had made a great point about not only refusing 'indirect' foreign aid, i.

In the face of such policies, the preparatory conferences of Katanga, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental and Bas-Congo recommended the exact opposite.

In Katanga the recommendations went further, asking that provincial authorities have the right to negotiate directly with foreign donors. Almost all the conferences urged that party political life be permitted. Coming from a government-sanctioned process, which consulted thousands of administrators, NGO leaders, members of the different churches, and others, the recommendations of these conferences had a greater legitimacy than almost any decision taken by the Kabila regime.

In addition the National Conference on Development, which was to be attended by representatives of the preparatory conferences, was given wide publicity, and invitations were extended to diplomatic representatives and to such figures as the Director of UNDP.

The regime risked having an agenda presented to the world under its own auspices, which was in direct opposition to its own political and social options. Some observers attributed this embarrassing development to the conflict between Minister Mbaya - who was dismissed and jailed - and the then rising power of Minister Kakudji.

This conflict probably played a role in the cancellation of the conference, which was more fundamentally due to the inherent weakness of a regime. Despite the fact that it controlled neither a viable party apparatus, a functioning administration nor an effective military, the government nonetheless wanted to impose a revolutionary and authoritarian agenda on a population which had limited taste for the program. These policies never completely succeeded although they did limit the freedom of action of these organisations to a greater degree than had been the case during the last years of Mobutu.

First, there was the attempt to direct through government channels the financial and other aid, which came to these organisations from abroad. This never fully succeeded although it was an enduring threat for the organisations concerned. Second, some NGO leaders who criticised government policies, especially in the area of human rights and democratisation, were jailed. Third, an attempt was made to oblige NGOs register with the Ministry of Justice which, had it been fully implemented, would have given the authorities the ability to pick and chose which was 'legal' and which was not.

Despite these pressures many leaders of civil society organisations continued to criticise and attack the regime and, it must be noted, made little distinction between social and political issues. They were their own mouthpiece and as noted, generally opposed to government policy and, due to their local networks, well aware of human rights and other violations. They fed international NGOs and media an ongoing stream of facts about violations of every sort.

The pattern of attempting to control Congolese society with limited tools can also be seen in the regime's relations with the media which, were in general openly critical of the regime, especially print.

Sporadically, the regime responded with newspaper closings and with the arrest of editors. Ultimately these moves did demonstrate the government's intent but did not eliminate a relatively broad degree of freedom of expression.

Relations with the churches, especially the Catholic Church, were somewhat different. In the first year and a half of Kabila's presidency, no genuine attempt was made to control the Church, despite the fact that its declarations supported policies, which the regime opposed. For example, a letter from the Permanent Committee of the Catholic Bishops of Congo on 2 July made the following points: it regretted that the new authorities had decided to reject the project which the people had adopted at the National Sovereign Conference and noted that certain acts were being committed by members of the new regime which did not respect the dignity of the human person.

People complained about expedited justice for minor infractions, mutilations, public executions and burnings, and 'inciting' hate against individuals who are so-called enemies of the people. In some cases that resulted in arrests, for example when a Protestant pastor compared Kabila's rule to Mobutu's. In summary, civil society as represented by the leaders of significant NGOs, the churches and the media in large part rejected the form of government which was being instituted by the Kabila regime.

They insisted on resuscitating the institutional projects outlined by the National Sovereign Conference. Although the regime never recognised either the legitimacy of the decisions of the National Sovereign Conference or the right of the civil society leaders to lobby for such a recognition, the regime was unable to silence them or to gain acceptance for its own projects.

It has been argued here that it is difficult to measure what ordinary Congolese thought and that the views expressed by their political and civil society elite may not have accurately reflected these opinions.

No similar instrument exists for the military and therefore, what views are available tend to deal with military policies or high officers exclusively. In a situation such as the one that has existed in Congo for the last two years, the composition of different army factions and the attitudes of ordinary soldiers are of crucial importance.

In the mids Kabila returned to Zaire and became one of the leaders and spokesmen of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo. As the numbers grew, he led the Tutsis against the Hutu forces, which resulted in the First Congo War in October As a result, Mobutu fled to exile on 16 May and Kabila proclaimed himself president the next day.

He was sworn in on 31 May and officially commenced his term as president. Do you find this information helpful? A small donation would help us keep this accessible to all. Forego a bottle of soda and donate its cost to us for the information you just learned, and feel good about helping to make it available to everyone! Rivet, N. Next Next post: Adama Barrow Image source, AFP. Rights groups criticised the trial.

Family members celebrate with pardoned prisoners at the Makala Prison in Kinshasa. You may also be interested in:. This video can not be played To play this video you need to enable JavaScript in your browser.

Related Topics. Published 29 December Published 24 January