How does russia feel about north korea

The North has been keen to discuss economic cooperation but has lacked the political will to reform its economy sufficiently for foreign investment, even from a country as inured to corruption and government interference as Russia. It is equally interested in technical and scientific aid. But there is unlikely to be much growth in bilateral cooperation unless the nuclear crisis is resolved peacefully, and the North opens its economy.

By asserting its place in the virtual realms of real-time politics and competing narratives on disinformation, Russia has joined its Western counterparts in transforming the status quo of international relations. Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our privacy policy for more details. Andes Central America. Overkill: Reforming the Legal Basis for the U. War on Terror. Up Next. Has Moscow managed to tilt the balance of power in its favour? Furthermore, the North Korean leader could confirm in Vladivostok that he is further extending the network of his relationships with leaders of the US and North-East Asian community — a symbol of prestige at home and recognition abroad that shouldn't be underestimated.

The remaining exception is Japan, whose Prime Minister Abe has recently expressed, without success, eagerness to meet the North Korean leader. If little beyond political gestures and symbols came out of the summit, it is also that the margin of manoeuvre is particularly narrow for the Russian leader. Even though Moscow and Beijing have repeatedly argued for a relaxation of the sanctions regime, neither has so far substantially departed from its UN obligations even on the return of migrant workers.

The same goes for the negotiation methodology. Moscow has aligned with Beijing on the demand of a resumption of direct negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang; a step by step approach of the denuclearization process; a relaxation of sanctions, and broader security supervision through the Six-Party framework though Beijing favours a Four-Party format: both Koreas, China and the US.

Besides, Moscow supports Chinese expectations of a US military withdrawal from South Korea — and ideally North-East Asia - in the context of a possible peace settlement. Unsurprisingly, neither China nor Russia is uncomfortable with the current situation, provided that there is no development conducive to a possible military conflict.

In their strategic calculations both Beijing and Moscow place their priority in securing stability in the region and maintaining the status quo. Pyongyang would hardly like to trade the burden of American threat with the political cost of any Russian and Chinese security umbrella - especially since it now possesses the nuclear deterrent.

Thus, the initiative, whatever rhetoric, may primarily be aimed at Washington, with two purposes in the mind of its authors. First, it may help demonstrating the potential new dimensions of the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, by reinforcing the perception - or the illusion - that new undeclared alliances are in the making in North-East Asia, between China and Russia, and possibly between both and North Korea.

Whereas the former idea is very much a work in progress, the chance of the latter to translate into reality remains dim. In both cases, the outcome will highly be influenced by the behaviour of another, unpredictable, actor: the United States. The timing of this initiative indicates that it may be, as a second purpose, designed to put pressure on the US-DPRK negotiations. Observers speculate that Pyongyang may have shifted its negotiation strategy from aiming at sanctions relief towards aiming to security guarantees both are core North Korean demands , as a consequence of the failure of the Hanoi summit between D.

Trump and Kim Jong Un. The Russian initiative would therefore boost the North Korean position by suggesting that progress in denuclearization could indeed be achieved by addressing the security expectations of the DPRK instead of sanctions relief. This idea would surely meet Chinese and Russian interests.

But it would be ill-advised, since the provision of large-scale security and military guarantees — possibly including a withdrawal of US military presence from the RoK - is likely to be a much more difficult issue for the US to consider than some sanctions relief except for the hawks that abhor both , especially as long as Pyongyang can prevail itself of its nuclear deterrent.

A shift of the negotiation towards the provision of large-scale security guarantees could therefore be the surest ways to perpetuate the deadlock in the US-DPRK negotiation, while increasing the risk for both to move back towards confrontation.

The prospect of a possible negotiation shift towards security guarantees does not bode well for Seoul.