Why jinnah regret of making pakistan

We are seventeen million in the north-eastern, and we constitute the majority of seventeen percent. We want the division of India into India and Pakistan because that is the only practical solution that will secure the freedom of the Hindu and Muslim. These two nations are entirely different. On such an inspiring speech, he said that Hindu and Muslim would-be neighbours and friends, but it didn't happen at all. Mr Jinnah, keeping his ambitions always high and given himself a guarantee of a successful future leader by his hard-working attitude.

The transfer of Muslim or Hindu from one division to another was the greatest calamities of the 20th century. The Promises, Money, Neighbors, and Lands were worthless.

Millions died, raped, and cut into pieces. The actual lovers of India middle-class didn't want the partition, and those hated the division of India had started forming their refugee camps. The painful partition took almost a complete five years to get back to normal life.

Mr Jinnah was Indian and he had founded a new democratic world called Pakistan, but later regretted the partition. The book Indian Summer : "Jinnah called the demand for Pakistan was the biggest blunder of his life.

The innocents did not know that their lives had been blown away by the power of political intrigue speeches of both the parties and the ultimate loss of the common people. Those middle-class who had nothing to do with either politics or nor religion. Days those who lived at the time of the partition, the stories bring the waves of fears. The rotten and decayed bodies of young pregnant women or sometimes kids or elders had been found in the gutters or canals for many months after the riots.

Jinnah's next question horrified him, though. The nearly year-old Muslim marrying his teenage daughter? The idea was "absurd! Jinnah was not to be discouraged, however, either personally or politically. He and Ruttie continued to correspond secretly. Like many of the youth in her circle she was enthralled by the romance of the nationalist movement, and that winter she eagerly followed the news coming out of the graceful Mughal city of Lucknow, capital of the United Provinces, where Jinnah had helped arrange for the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress to hold their annual sessions simultaneously.

For the first time the two parties agreed on a common set of demands to make of the British - what became known as the "Lucknow Pact. The Lucknow Pact raised Jinnah's political stock sky-high; he seemed a shoo-in to become president not just of the League, but perhaps even the much larger Congress one day.

A few months later, soon after Ruttie had turned 18, she and Jinnah scandalized Bombay's Parsi community by eloping. They quickly became one of the city's most glamorous couples, cruising down Marine Drive in Jinnah's convertible at sunset each night, her hair loose in the wind. Then Jinnah threw it all away. Just as his political career was reaching its zenith, the spotlight shifted to another Gujarati lawyer, born just 30 miles from Jinnah's ancestral village. In a year-old Mahatma Gandhi had returned to India from South Africa, where he had lived for the past two decades, and where his efforts to organize South Africa's Indian immigrant community had made him a celebrity.

Gandhi dubbed his strategy satyagraha - literally, "soul force" - and he now proposed replicating his methods in India. Was this a bargaining counter? Her argument on the contrary was that the demand for a federation in the Muslim majority areas was made in earnest but that what kind of relations such a federation would have with the rest of India was a matter that was the subject of negotiation. Another point was that at the crunch point of that negotiation, Jinnah had climbed down from that demand and accepted something less than Muslim majority federation by accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan.

However at no point did Jinnah waver from his goal, which essentially was a contract between Hindus and Muslims to achieve the independence of India.

Whether the consideration of the transaction was to be a federation or a confederation or complete separation was a question of negotiation. He said as much in a speech in adding that his weapons were logic and reason. More importantly he had the measure of his constituents, the Muslims. Secularism simpliciter would have little appeal to them. It was to be a vehicle for advancement of the Muslim community in a positive sense. Jinnah the politician thus referred to Islam and its structures in that sense while simultaneously Jinnah the constitutional lawyer made sure that any reference to Islamic principles or to theological issues was skillfully omitted from any official resolutions or documents of the Muslim League.

There were several attempts, most notably in at the Delhi session to commit the Muslim League to an Islamic polity based on Quran and Sunnah which Jinnah vetoed. The second thing Jinnah was extremely careful about was keeping theological arguments out of the question of who is a Muslim. To him Ahmadis were Muslims because they professed to be Muslim. Again several attempts were made to influence him both by Congress backed Majlis-e-Ahrar and people within the Muslim League but he steadfastly refused to turn Ahmadis out of the League on grounds of a theological disagreement.

Indeed the one man Jinnah came to rely on in his career was Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi. The state that Jinnah had in mind was to have the same kind of relationship with Islam that modern Britain had with the Anglican Church. That the British model of the relationship between religion and state weighed heavily on his mind is obvious from his 11 August speech. A Muslim majority democratic state was by its character already a Muslim country, just as Britain was an Anglican country and India was, by virtue of its Hindu majority, a Hindu country.

There was no need to translate its Islamic character into a binding constitutional document. Pakistan was to be a Muslim majority mirror state of India, with minorities as equal citizens of the state. Again the implication was clear. Against this background it is easy enough to see why Jinnah might want to dissociate himself from the state he created.

Part of it had become apparent to him in his lifetime as he is reported to have called the creation of Pakistan the biggest blunder of his life. If Jinnah had hoped for a social contract between Hindus and Muslims, leading to perpetual peace, it was shattered with the bloodletting that the two communities engaged in at the time of partition.

Contrary to his vision of a South Asia where Pakistan and India would have a relationship like the US and Canada, the two countries have engaged in a nuclear arms race. The communal issue that Jinnah sought to resolve has now metamorphosed into an international conflict. Nor has his vision of an inclusive state, impartial to personal of an individual citizen, been realized.

His colleagues in the Muslim League, themselves Muslim modernists, made the first crucial mistake by passing the Objectives Resolution. By referring directly to Quran and Sunnah, they ensured the interpreters of the future constitution would not be them, the lawyers and politicians, but the ulema.

Inevitably a Pakistan based on Objectives Resolution would be a theocracy, notwithstanding the intentions of its authors. In Pakistan lost its more secular minded East Pakistani majority and with it its raison d etre as a Muslim homeland.